...long distance calls have long subsidized local service, especially
in rural areas where local telephone lines are particularly expensive to
provide...
.
...Local
calling areas, after all, are merely a tariff artifact, a retail pricing
technique. They have no basis in cost....
...they seek to classify CLEC-bound calls as toll, so that they can be
on the receiving, rather than sending, end of the payment stream for
calls they send to CLECs...
...MCI's
alleged misrouting of calls is an example of the risks of call
classification...
|
Americans are accustomed to having a distinction between "local" and
"toll" calls. In almost all of the country, residential telephone
subscribers are allowed to make as many local calls as they want at no
charge -- a true flat rate. But they're accustomed to paying by the
minute for toll calls. This retail pricing distinction goes back to the
early years of telephony, and while there are those who argue that all
calls should cost the same, for so-called postalized rates, there are plenty
of reasons for distinctions to remain. Internet backbone providers
haven't exactly made great profits out of their postalized rate
structure! And don't even think about the hue and cry that
has come up every time a telephone company has proposed abolishing flat
rate local service.
But a cost-justified distinction between different types of retail rates, or for that matter a
cost-justified distinction in wholesale inter-carrier rates, is not the same
as the current system. As a result of a long chain of federal and state
regulatory decisions, telephone calls are subject to an arbitrary system
of classification, in which rates are based on rather historical "value
of service" constructs. This was workable during the monopoly era,
when there were no alternatives, but it's causing far more harm than
good today.
Exchange vs. toll
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 made substantial changes in the
structure of the industry, but some were rather subtle. It did
not, alas, do away with arbitrary call classification. Instead, it
divided telephone calls into two categories, telephone exchange service and exchange access. Telecom
lawyer Chris Savage has noted, "Under the 1996 Act, a service is
"exchange access" only if it is used for the origination or termination
of 'telephone toll service,' another defined term in the Act."
Telephone toll service applies when the carrier levies a toll charge for
making calls. Other calls are, by the plain language of the Act,
telephone exchange service.
When newly-minted CLECs started picking up calls directed for ISPs in
the 1990s, the incumbents balked, since the way CLECs and ILEC pay each
other is based upon what type of call it is. For telephone
exchange service, the originating local carrier pays reciprocal compensation to the
terminating carrier. For exchange access, the interexchange
carrier pays switched access,
and pays it to the
originating carrier. In effect, exchange access calls are
originated "collect". Since ISP-bound calls aren't charged tolls,
the originating ILECs couldn't legally charge switched access, although
they sometimes tried, and continue to try. (ILECs are nothing if
not trying.) But an ILEC-friendly FCC in 2001 decided to discover
a third category of calls, information
access, hidden in a section of the Act that almost anyone
else would read to refer to things like 900-number calls. And thus
exempted the ILECs from paying CLECs for calls classified as ISP-bound. To be sure, this
gambit hasn't exactly been blessed by the relevant courts, but it
remains in effect for the foreseeable future.
The particular classification of calls as local or toll, telephone
exchange service vs. exchange access, has two rational motivations
behind it. For one thing, long distance calls have long subsidized
local service, especially in rural areas where local telephone lines are
particularly expensive to provide. Thus switched access rates in
rural areas can be as much as an order of magnitude higher than in urban
(Bell) areas. This is part of the industry's cross-subsidy
structure, along with explicit High Cost Support payments from the
FCC-overseen Universal Service Fund. A second rationale is that the IXC,
not the originating LEC, has the billing relationship with the caller,
and thus is the logical one to pay for the originating leg of the
call. (They pay for the terminating leg too, but because the IXC
is the caller, that leg of the call is sent paid, and thus the only
issue is price, not who pays whom.)
The 1984 restructuring of the domestic telephone industry created a
Chinese wall between the local and long distance industries, with these
access charge payments an integral part of the scheme. The Telecom
Act of 1996 allowed the players on each side to enter each others'
markets, but it did not remove the distinction between the IXC and LEC
roles. ILECs who provide LD services are still required to
maintain accounting separation between the two lines of business, and
deal at arms' length. Albeit very short arms, at this point.
The problem is most serious within a LATA
Call classification causes the most grief when applied to intraLATA
calls, especially between CLECs and ILECs. In such cases, there is
no IXC present, so the calls could rationally be handed off on a
reciprocal compensation basis, like any other local call. Local
calling areas, after all, are merely a tariff artifact, a retail pricing
technique. They have no basis in cost, and local interconnection
in general is theoretically based on cost, not retail pricing. The
problerm is that most ILEC-CLEC interconnect agreements (ICAs) require
the originating carrier to pay intrastate
switched access rates on calls sent to destinations that are
outside of the ILEC-defined local
calling area. Switched
access rates are often much higher than reciprocal compensation;
intrastate switched access rates are also often much higher than
corresponding interstate rates. (Reciprocal compensation is moving
towards zero, as the FCC encourages "bill and keep" as the long-term
solution to the "ISP problem".) So the CLEC cannot offer an
enhanced local calling area unless it eats the terminating access
charges.
But sometimes it gets even worse than that. ILECs are so
accustomed to feeding at the access charge trough that they even want to
collect these charges from CLECs for inbound
calls. That is, they seek to classify CLEC-bound calls as toll, so
that they can be on the receiving, rather than sending, end of the
payment stream for calls they send to CLECs. This is done by narrowing
the qualifications for a call to be classified as local, and assuming
that a call must otherwise be toll, or at least subject to access
charges.
They attempt to justify this in various ways, typically taking
advantage of the differences in ILEC and CLEC network
architectures. ILECs used to put switches at every wire center,
and defined local calling areas based on having direct trunks between
these switches. Nowadays, ILECs typically serve rural areas with
host-remote clusters, with the trunks concentrated at the host. Retail
tariffs don't take this into account. A CLEC has to interconnect
with the serving tandem, and sometimes with the host, but essentially
never with the remote. CLECs have fewer switches, and they almost
never have copper loops directly connected to them; one CLEC switch
typically services a large geographic area, like an ILEC host or
tandem.
ISP modems are usually collocated with CLEC switches. This is
purely pragmatic. A modem bank essentially compresses bandwidth by
about 10:1, since a modem channel into the switch is 64000 bits per
second and the average data usage of a modem is more like 6000 bits per
second. The ISP would need ten times the bandwidth from the CLEC
to its site if it were to have its modems on site, vs. collocating them
with the CLEC and just forwarding the data. ILECs, as a general
policy, do not allow modems to collocate at their central offices.
So rather than accept this as a competitive advantage of CLECs, or
(heaven forbid!) become more competitive by allowing ISPs to collocate,
ILECs have taken to attacking CLEC-collocated modems as being toll
calls, not local! This can happen when the switch, and thus the
modem, happens to not be within the ILEC's own local calling area.
For instance, the CLEC may have its switch in Dallas, but use it to
service Fort Worth and Waco numbers as well. It's no additional
cost to the ILEC if the ISP's modems are at the CLEC switch, but they
use this as a competitive weapon for their own captive ISPs, and just
maybe (this is far-fetched, given market realities) as a source of
future toll revenues.
Gaming the system or just plain cheating?
The recent brouhaha concerning concerning MCI's alleged misrouting of
calls is an example of the risks of call classification. Several
companies, including SBC, Verizon and AT&T, allege that MCI passed
off toll calls as local as a way to avoid switched-access charges.
From my own experience, this is credible. I've received calls
placed by MCI subscribers whose Caller ID was erroneous. Instead of
showing the caller's out-of-state number, the Caller ID identified a
local number. The local number was in a block belonging to CLEC
Focal Communications. This implies that MCI did not terminate the
calls directly into the LEC network as switched access, but instead
re-originated the calls, using Focal-provided lines, as if they were
locally originated. (Doing this on lines that showed Caller ID was
astonishingly stupid. If you're going to cheat, even on a stupid
rule, you're a fool to do it so openly. MCI Worldcom had plenty of
local switches of its own that could be set to show "out of area".)
The reason that this matters at all is because switched access charges,
while much lower than they once were (at their peak in the 1980s, around
eight cents at either end in Bell areas, more elsehwere; today they're
under a penny a minute in Bell areas), they're still a major part of
long distance company expenses. Verizon's own business-rate local
service in Boston costs more
than switched access, at 1.7 cents per minute! But because the
ILECs objected to reciprocal compensation after discovering themselves
to be at the losing end of it, CLECs are now being moved towards
bill-and-keep for local calls. So a local call through a CLEC
often costs nothing.
But as a result of classification, it gets worse. If the CLEC has
a lot of incoming ISP traffic, then the FCC's current rules encourage
even more egregious gaming. Traffic is generally assumed to be
ISP-bound, a classification that carries no reciprocal compensation, if
it is more than 3:1 out of balance. With no outbound traffic, no inbound
reciprocal compensation is due. So if a CLEC receives 10 million minutes
a month from Verizon and only sends Verizon 1 million local minutes,
then the CLEC receives a net
reciprocal compensation settlement of 2 million minutes (7 million
minutes are assumed to be ISP-bound, 3 million allowable inbound vs. 1
million out). Get it? Now, if the CLEC originates an
additional 2 million minutes, it receives a net setlement for 6 million
minutes! The CLEC essentially gets paid to originate calls, unitl it gets to
its 3:1 ratio. No wonder Focal and MCI were such a match.
A more rational system would be for all
intercarrier interconnection to be at cost-based rates. The LEC
would be paid the same for its part of a "local" (reciprocal
compensation) or "toll" (switched access) call. Implicit subsidies
from higher-than-cost switched access would be moved to the explicit
Universal Service Fund, collected on a broader base of revenues.
LECs would set their own local calling areas.
The FCC has been afraid of an unclassified system of interconnection,
even though it is widely used in Europe and elsewhere. The current
classification-based subsidy mechanisms have too many influential
carriers, their lobbyists and their lawyers supporting them. But
call classification remains a major impediment to a true competitive
market for telecommunications service. |